

*Étude sur quelques Paralysies d'origine psychique. Essai de Psychologie Expérimentale.* Par A. GRAFÉ, Professeur à l'Athénée royal de Liège. Bruxelles : F. Hayez, 1889. Pp. 122.

The special aim of this study is to determine the psychological cause of a kind of paralysis in which the patients find it impossible to move one or other of their limbs unless they can follow the movements of the limb with the eye. After giving a careful account of all the recorded cases the author goes on to attempt first a physiological explanation. The physiological explanation, he finds, can only be a certain derangement of the physical concomitants of associated sensations. Before the action can take place, the patient requires a particular order of sensations different from the usual one; and this requirement may be the consequence of some abnormal association. This explanation, however, is too general. The problem is to determine why in this particular case a particular order and no other is required. For a definite solution, we must go to psychology. The author's psychological explanation depends on a theory of which the central point is that ability to bring about changes in the external world is in every case the result of a certain grouping of images of the muscular sense. In a volition there are representations of the end and of the means. The "medial representations" are always motor images. Education of the will carries with it reduction of the medial representations to a low degree of consciousness. Selection of the means in habitual as in instinctive actions takes place entirely without our knowledge. The unconsciousness in which the medial representations are involved, however, is never absolute. They merely pass into a kind of "penumbra" of consciousness. If, then, in the form of paralysis under investigation, we suppose that there is a "weakening" of the sub-conscious "medial representations," we shall be able to explain why, although the end is distinctly represented, the appropriate movements are not produced. The reason is that the intensity of the medial representations is no longer sufficient to bring about the series of movements that leads to the desired result. Naturally the patient cannot discover this for himself; for under ordinary circumstances he is not aware of the presence of the medial representations, and consequently cannot directly become aware of their absence. The explanation, however, is confirmed by many other pathological facts (cited by the author at length); and the verification is supplied in the particular case by the manner in which the movements cease either immediately or almost immediately with suppression of "visual control". That visual control should make action possible follows at once from what has been said of the function of the medial representations. For when these links in the ideal process of action are weakened, what is required is to revive them; and they are revived by the detailed apprehension of every step in the external process. Revival, under the particular circumstances of the patients experimented on—who as a rule suffer from anæsthesia of the limbs involved—can accordingly be obtained best through the visual sense. When it can be obtained otherwise, the power of movement is recovered just as when it is made possible by "visual control".

J. PUTSAGE. *La Foi, la Force et la Raison.* Bruxelles : Imprimerie Veuve Monnom, 1890. Pp. 60.

M. Putsage here gives in brief form a statement of the philosophical doctrine set forth in his *Études de Science réelle* (MIND xiv. 293) along with a more definite view of the reorganisation of society to which he looks