

tion of Schopenhauer's *Aphorismen zur Lebensweisheit* into two parts. The first part, entitled *The Wisdom of Life*, was noted in *MIND*, No. 59, p. 421. In the present volume, with its new title, a new series of chapters has been begun, "for the sake of appearances," though there is no such division in the original. The merits of the translation are sustained to the end.

On Sameness and Identity. A Psychological Study: Being a contribution to the foundations of a Theory of Knowledge. By GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Pp. 156.

Prof. Fullerton has once before set himself the task of clearing up a difficult fundamental conception of philosophy (see *MIND* xii. 468). The problem of infinity, dealt with in his former essay, reappears at the end of the present monograph; the question dealt with in the penultimate section being that of infinite divisibility, which is solved in accordance with Berkeleyan principles. Realism (in its modern sense) is discussed in the section immediately preceding, and is dismissed as involving confusions of different meanings of the word "sameness". As may be seen from the nature of these final disquisitions, the metaphysical bearings of the abstract discriminations between senses of the term are not forgotten. The discriminations themselves are very careful; seven senses of the word "sameness" being distinguished. Following upon the definitions of these senses, there are sections containing the application of them to "self" and "not-self," whether regarded as phenomenal or noumenal. Part i. (pp. 5-66), containing the abstract discussion of "The Kinds of Sameness," is followed by an "Historical and Critical" part ii. (pp. 67-153), dealing with the senses of the term as employed in philosophical arguments from Heraclitus to the present time. The author does not propose any rigid limitation of the term "sameness" in philosophy to one particular sense. "The word," he would rather conclude, "has many meanings, and we can hardly say that any one of them is illegitimate. It is merely illegitimate to confound them." "Identity" he looks upon as a kind of limiting conception. The common notion which unites all the kinds of sameness is the notion of similarity. When the dissimilar elements have diminished to zero, then there is "identity". The word is somewhat loosely used, but it may be stated generally that "men use the word identity to mark certain kinds of sameness in which there is little or no consciousness of duality, and they are not inclined to use it to mark sameness in which things are recognised as similar but clearly distinct". The discussion of the sameness of the formal elements in consciousness (sec. 17) may be specially noted. The result is that if two successive occurrences of a material element—say, a colour-sensation—are only similar and not numerically the same, this is also the case with two successive occurrences of a formal element—say, "the consciousness of triangularity". "To say that the formal element is not a thing, but an activity, does not alter the position. If an activity is enough of a thing to be talked about and distinguished from other things, we may surely recognise an activity in consciousness yesterday as numerically different from an activity in consciousness to-day." [The author desires that the words "be recognised as resembling" be substituted for "resemble" on p. 12, line 13, and p. 49, line 30; and "second" for "fourth" on p. 68, line 24.]

Etude sur François Bacon suivie du Rapport à l'Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques sur le Concours ouvert pour le Prix Bordin.

Par J. BARTHÉLEMY ST. HILAIRE, Membre de l'Institut, Sénateur.
Paris : F. Alcan, 1890. Pp. vii., 203.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire's study of Bacon extends over pp. 1-109. The rest of the volume contains his report on the four memoirs sent in for the Bordin prize offered by the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences. In the study, perhaps greater stress is laid on Bacon's defects as a thinker than on his merits; but almost always the right view seems to be taken as to what is the nature of his merits and defects. His literary style, the author allows, cannot be overpraised. "The true glory of Bacon" is rightly assigned in his own phrase, when he describes himself as the "trumpeter" of the experimental method. He did not discover the method; nor was he the first to formulate the process of induction, this having been done by Aristotle. Metaphysics he on the one side sacrificed to theology, on the other side subordinated to science. He failed therefore to attain to the philosophical position of Aristotle, whom he cast aside. "In recommending the experimental method with so much constancy and energetic conviction, he certainly propagated it; he caused its utility to be better appreciated by those who were employing it without sufficiently reflecting on it. But that is not precisely a scientific influence" (p. 162). So far as real originality of scientific thought is concerned, he was surpassed by his predecessor and namesake Roger Bacon.

Métaphysique et Psychologie. Par. TH. FLOURNOY, Docteur en Médecine, Privat-docent de Philosophie à l'Université de Genève. Genève: H. Georg, 1890. Pp. vii., 135.

A very good statement of the parallelism of mental and physiological processes from the scientific point of view; the author's aim being to distinguish clearly the psychophysical position of the experimental psychologist from every metaphysical doctrine as to the relation between mind and body. He first shows how the "principle of parallelism or concomitance" has now become a "constitutive axiom" of physiological psychology; and then proceeds to explain how he finds it possible to make reserves in favour even of metaphysical free-will (for example) without giving up the principle as a postulate of all strictly scientific investigation. Personally he inclines to a doctrine which he describes as "agnostic Moralism" and places on the ground of Kant's distinction between phenomenal determination and noumenal freedom; but what he is chiefly anxious to show is the possibility and necessity of setting physiological psychology free from all metaphysical implications. Psychology as a positive science must follow the example of other sciences by ignoring the philosophic difficulties at its base. It must make no attempt to explain *why* mental and physical phenomena are concomitant, but must simply accept them as being so. The two sets of phenomena being irreducible for science, a *scientific* "principle of dualism or heterogeneity" is to be recognised beside the principle of parallelism or concomitance. While it affirms that all psychical processes are accompanied by some physical process, the axiom of concomitance does not affirm that, conversely, all physical processes are accompanied by some internal psychical process. This may or may not be so, but it is a metaphysical completion of the scientific doctrine, and, as such, positive psychology has no interest in it. If psychology, to become a positive science, must become as far as possible physiological, physiology, on the other side, is in no way bound to become psychological. Its progress, on the contrary, consists in more and more complete explanation of its special facts by the objective sciences that precede it.