

LITERARY CORRESPONDENCE.

FRANCE.

WE BEGIN, to-day, with four works treating, from different points of view, of substantially the same question, that of plurality and unity, of phenomenism and monism, around which the "theory of knowledge" incessantly revolves.

M. DE ROBERTY, in his work, *Auguste Comte et Herbert Spencer, nouvelle contribution à l'histoire des idées philosophiques au XIX. siècle*, studies, in the form of a criticism of the systems of these two philosophers, what he calls: "The conflict of two great cerebral waves, which flow in opposite directions: monism and agnosticism." In vain, he says, has the spirit of synthesis sought to force them into one bed. The undertaking was illusory, and we have seen, ever since Kant, the philosophers wandering afield in efforts to "combine the quest for unity with the dualism of knowledge." Their efforts after universal synthesis have turned back upon their agnosticism, formal or latent, whichever it was.

The criticisms of M. De Roberty are exceedingly interesting, although at times difficult and abrupt. Auguste Comte, he well shows, sought after the idea of unity not less than did Spencer; and we must accept as equivalent the idea of evolution adopted by the latter and the idea of a necessary and gradual development amplified by the former. Yes, the Comtian hierarchy of the sciences and the so-called law of the three stages does involve the idea of evolution, as I have observed more than once myself. But what is to be seen in evolutionism if not the affirmation of the experience which implies, under the forms of differentiation and integration,

“the two sole modes by which the mind seizes now the multiplicity of things and now their unity?”

We shall always, writes M. De Roberty, apprehend things or their *notions*, their *ideas*, by the aid of two opposed concepts. But that procedure, natural as it may appear, is after all nothing but a procedure, a method, a means. “It cannot set itself up as a definitive result, a final conclusion, an end in itself.” Agnosticism, he continues, has never been willing to comprehend that simple truth. It appeals to the principle of the relativity of knowledge. But it is imperative that we should have some understanding of the true meaning of the principle of relativity. Its foundation is the *identity of contraries*, and relativism presents itself in the final result “as the psychological aspect of the principle of universal unity.”

Comtian or Spencerian monism, with agnosticism and evolutionism, according to M. De Roberty, is the third of the great dogmas to which the universal conceptions of the past, be they theological or metaphysical, can be successively reduced. Comte wished to obviate the faults of doctrinal pluralism (he went so far, we will remember, as to declare the fundamental facts of the abstract sciences irreducible) by proclaiming the preponderance of the social or moral element, in doing which he reverted to the old teleological anthropomorphism. Spencer, in his turn, arrived at a reconciliation of the simple and the manifold only by means of a verbalism that masked the purely conceptual nature of the laws invoked by him as representing the facts. Confounding, instead of combining, the points of view of the different sciences, he succeeded at best in merely “flashing before our eyes, in the face of the purely logical unity of facts, the phantom of their unity, called real or transcendent.” Let us note this last trait well. There lies the profound word of this criticism.

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M. E. BOIRAC, in his *L'idée du phénomène*, a clear and well-sustained work, skirts closely the thesis of M. De Roberty. He, too, battles against the noumenon of Kant and the unknowable of Spencer. Phenomenism and idealism—those two aspects have seduced the human mind, each in its turn! Now, what happens! When

the philosopher, if I may be allowed the metaphor, proclaims phenomenonism, the reduction of substance and being to pure phenomenal modalities, a malicious genius places before his eyes a mirror which sends back to him his own image; and when he proclaims idealism, the reduction of phenomena to thought, the same genius in place of the mirror holds before him a transparent glass, through which he sees the world depicted. In the two cases he is aware of the inherent contradiction of his artificial monism, and seeks his refuge in subsidiary conceptions, in compromises with the dualism of sensible experience.

M. Boirac has rehabilitated, as he himself confesses, the substantialism of Leibnitz, with amendments. For him the phenomenon is not all. Objective knowledge and phenomenon are synonymous. The duality, the opposition of seeming and being, of matter and mind, is not necessary. "The phenomenon and the substance are inseparable from one another, as they are two complementary correlative aspects under which all existence appears both to us and to itself." Substance exists, therefore, but it is naught else than the thought itself of the relation which binds the phenomena together, the real and living idea, the intuition of their solidarity, of their inner continuity.

It would seem as if M. Boirac had, by a dialectics of his own, arrived at the logical monism of M. De Roberty. Nevertheless, the obstacle which he finds in the multiplicity of the *partial* thoughts reveals in him a distinct type of mind. How are we to reconcile that multiplicity, he asks, with the unity of the universal subject, with the *total* thought? That problem, which appears to him formidable, indicates perhaps the disquietude of a transcendent substantial monism, which may soon lead him to give a new shape to the difficulties which he has sought to solve.

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In his *Définition de la philosophie* M. ERNEST NAVILLE affirms once more his spiritualistic faith. To him spiritualism is the only monism reconcilable with the distinction between the elements of the universe established by philosophical analysis, the only one which resolves the problem of the coexistence of the simple and the mul-

tipler, and of the finite and infinite. The free-will of man, the postulate of the moral order, has only place, he repeats, in a doctrine which makes of liberty the principle of the world. The distinguished and venerable professor also demands that "the practical consequences of systems of philosophy should be one of the essential elements of their valuation." But how are we to determine, in advance, the practical consequences of a system? Where are we to get the criterion to judge them by? If we went to the bottom of the question, we should soon come again upon all the difficulties which it clears up.

Affiliated with the philosophy of M. Naville is that tendered to us under the title of *Science et conscience, ou théorie de la force progressive*, by M. KLEFFLER, an engineer who died recently. The "philosophy of common sense" M. Kleffler calls it, considering the affirmations of spiritualism as the data of common sense; or "the natural method," for it appears to him inconceivable that philosophy should not assume the task of reconciling the objective data analysed by science with the subjective data furnished by consciousness. I see pretty clearly where our author, who is a mystic without knowing it, would lead us. But how difficult the road is! What abuse of dialectics, what absurd obscurity! Common sense, of whom? That of M. Kleffler or that of M. De Roberty? That of the eleventh or that of the twenty-first century? Common sense is not something primitive, it is something resultant. How are we to prove that the common sense or consciousness of one class of individuals, or of one historical epoch, expresses the necessary, universal mentality? There is nothing universal and necessary except our logical actions which have worked to produce the qualified mental states of the "common sense." But those products themselves are changeable and modifiable in a large measure. The mill-stone of our mill serves for grinding grain of all sorts; according to the grain which we give it, will be the flour it grinds for us.

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We come now to a few books on psychology. The first is the *Introduction à la psychologie expérimentale* of the Messrs. A. BINET, PHILIPPE, COURTIER, and V. HENRI. The second is also a work

by M. BINET entitled *Psychologie des grands calculateurs et joueurs d'échecs*.¹ I need not speak of them here as both were reviewed in the October *Monist*, of last year.

I shall not pass so rapidly over the little volume of M. GASTON DANVILLE, *La psychologie de l'amour*. It might have been better composed and livelier in style. But it has its value, and we must accede to M. Danville the merit of having searched for and perhaps found a "psychological" definition of love, that is to say, of the affective and intellectual state which accompanies the sexual appetite in the higher animal—in man. His formula is a little complicated, and I hesitate to transcribe it. It will suffice to indicate its sense, to give the analysis which has led him to it. That analysis, running along the scale of the animal species, shows an evolution which has made love pass from its *motor* phase to its *affective* phase and from thence to the *intellectual* phase. In the motor stage the appetite engenders only movements, in the affective stage it is manifested along with a cortège of characteristic emotions. The intellectual period, finally, which is only realised in the heroes of love, reveals by the choice of the object loved and the consciousness of the goal pursued, a more complete systematisation in actual sight of an *ideal* preformed and recognised. Max Nordau had previously signalled the prominent rôle of the ideal in love. But M. Danville had not read the *Paradoxes* of that author, and I regret also that he has not spoken of the *Psychologie der Liebe* of Julius Duboc, if, peradventure, he knows of it. The work of that philosopher, which I have discussed in France,² merited mention in M. Danville's book.

Still the psychological side of love should not cause us to neglect too much the physiological side. Without the sexual appetite the whole psychical tableau would be effaced. Love remains essentially an appetite, like hunger and thirst. The accoutrements alone change. The delicate, high-strung lover resembles in some respects a connoisseur of wines who embellishes the gross needs of the table by eating and drinking upon fine linen, in flowered porce-

¹Published by Hachette ; the other works mentioned are published by Alcan.

²*Un athée idéaliste*, in the *Revue philosophique*, Nov., 1884.

lains, and from polished crystals. Yet eat and be nourished he must; ultimately, it is the same affair.

This M. Danville does not gainsay. Where he seems to me to carry things too far is when he refuses to see a pathological symptom in that "excessive" obsession, which leads the lover to absurd or criminal acts. True, I do not wish to say that a man is insane for loving passionately. But the criterion of "utility" invoked by M. Danville for the justification of the Werthers is insufficient; it leaves us a deficit in the analysis of the facts. Amorous obsession, he tells us, is useful because it makes for procreation. But that end could have been just as well attained with another woman. And it is recognised by poets and physicians of love that one *can* truly love more than once. Besides, the end is totally lost when suicide is committed or when one does not recover. The criterion ought to be sought rather in the power of inhibition. It is not so much aberrancy of mind that causes the morbid obsession, as impotence in getting away from it and escaping from its anguish. If this power is null or very weak in individuals, it is imperative to look upon such at least as neurasthenic subjects. The writers of to-day will have much on their hands. They will not make us accept as normal and virile individuals, the heroes of their passionate dramas. The Werthers burn out their brains, or worse still; the Goethes survive. After a certain stage the lover becomes the dupe of his imagination, and to his great detriment the equilibrium is destroyed in him, between the angel and the brute. Supposing him to have a more vigorous temperament, and a richer affective equipment, he will resist and he will love again. The incapacity for a new ideal marks only the exhaustion of the nerves and the impoverishment of the sentimental life, far from signifying force and superb expansion.

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We have now to speak of a book, which in my judgment is a remarkable one, *Le sentiment et la pensée et leurs principaux aspects physiologiques* by M. ANDRÉ GODFERNAUX. I have read this book with all the more sympathy as M. Godfernaux has drawn his inspiration from M. Ribot's instructive oral courses, and from the clinical lectures of my master and friend, Dr. Magnan. The task he

has set himself is to seek out the relations which exist between sentiment and thought, that is to say, between the phenomena of the affective life, of internal origin, and the phenomena of representative life, of external origin. The various forms of mental alienation have supplied him with so many striking examples of these relations, the affective state has appeared to him, in psychosis and chronic delirium, so visibly the agent which influences the systematisation of thoughts, that far from the intellectual troubles having their origin in the thought itself he has been led to conclude, that in the normal consciousness, sentiment and thought should be in equilibrium, and that the one should grow as the other diminishes. In fact, in this respect normal psychology repeats morbid psychology, and this important consequence then imposes itself upon us that "the affective state is, even in a healthy individual, the ultimate agent in the association of ideas." Beyond question, ideas and systems of ideas cannot be welded together mechanically. The individual activity of the subject must intervene. And it is incumbent upon us to ascertain what that activity in its ultimate roots is.

I am favorably disposed to this theory, for I have touched upon it myself in a work just published and having for its title *Mémoire et imagination*. I, too, insist in this work on the motor elements which "double the systems of perceptions" that I there study, and I point out, for example, the ideo-motor nature of the professional memory of the painter, the musician, and the orator.

M. Godfernaux also emphasises what he calls the "motor-equivalent" of the affective state. The basis of our inner life, according to him, is made up of *tendencies* (Ribot's theory). Now, these tendencies, acquired or transmitted, especially the latter, are, he says, the underlying "dynamic associations" to which our *emotions* correspond. When the tendency, seeking to satisfy itself, systematises definite muscular elements, the emotion produces a synthesis of definite elements of consciousness, that is, of associations of ideas. The parallelism, in fine, is constant and rigorous between the conscious and the motor life. "The phenomena of consciousness act and react upon one another, and combine with one another

like the motor phenomena to which they correspond." This formula epitomises the whole work.

I am sorry that I cannot dwell at length upon this study. I shall point out, in closing, simply its "philosophical" conclusion. M. Godfernaux accepts a dualism of matter and mind, which, in my judgment, signifies nothing more than the collaboration in the human individual of heredity and personal initiative. A law which binds together body and mind, he says, asserts that body and mind tend alike to adapt themselves to their environment. What is here biological function is there logic and reason. But what is the essence of the adaptation? What is the true personal capital of the individual in the vast aggregate of the inherited influence of his species? That question still remains open.

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Four important works on sociology next claim our attention. Let us see if we can make clear to ourselves their spirit and scope.

First, M. G. TARDE gives us his *Logique sociale*, a large volume of nearly five hundred pages and constituting the sequel to his *Lois de l'imitation*, of which I have spoken before. This work, like all the books of M. Tarde, is conspicuous for the wealth of its ideas, and the originality of its point of view. I should say even that the profuseness of details in this instance hinders a clear comprehension of the whole. The author aims at a reconstruction of sociology. What is his idea here? Auguste Comte, and after him Herbert Spencer, links sociology with biology. M. Tarde is more particularly concerned with psychology. The two first-mentioned philosophers likened societies to organisms; the latter prefers to compare them to that anomalous and privileged organ, the brain. Such are the premises from which all the rest follows.

First, an observation. Undoubtedly, Comte in the classification of the sciences rested sociology on biology. But it is to be remembered that in his view psychology is merely a branch of biology, and it is absolutely impossible to contest that he connected the development of society with a confessedly psychological principle. According to Comte, ideas "rule the world," and his celebrated "law of the three stages," which is also a law of evolution, makes

the progress of society depend on a purely intellectual element. Comte did not, therefore, in the rigorous manner that Spencer did, liken societies to brainless organisms, and M. Tarde might claim him as his predecessor. However, let us see to what results this comparison of society with the cerebral organ leads us. The novelty of the point of view will be evident.

Comte had confined himself to deducing from a general study of history his law of succession of the theological, metaphysical, and scientific stages; he explained history by the internal action of the methods that had produced and sustained those truly characteristic epochs of human thought. Littré has since shown—I may be permitted here to remind the reader of it—that whilst the law of the three stages is still properly applicable to *intellectual* development, it no longer suits well with the development of *economical* and *artistic* facts. Without discussing at present the merits and the defects of that formula of Comte, let us observe that this philosopher gave his law as a complete whole, and that he did not go back to the psychological study of man, who is the real factor of history. Now it is just here that M. Tarde, basing his views on the numerous results recently reached in psychology, has made his innovations and additions.

In the first place, he advances the extremely apt reflexion that that which has been actually and historically realised is a part only of what could or might have been realised. Determinism admits of *possibilities*. There can be no doubt, I think, that biological developments *could* have taken place that have nevertheless been arrested. Human history also presents us with lines of growth which have been cut short or have been unequally developed. It will be sufficient to mention that phenomenon in Chinese history which has reached such interesting organisation and is founded on the perpetuity of family and the inalienable family property.¹ Starting from this idea of possibilities, M. Tarde has had to forego the consideration of evolution in an undeviating straight line. He has not sought,

¹ I shall have something to say later concerning the studies of M. EUGÈNE SIMON, *La cité chinoise, Sur la terre et par la terre, Le familial*, etc.

he tells us, to disengage the historical succession of events from its actual concatenation with inventions and discoveries; he has only sought to point out the *ensemble* of their possible concatenation. The allusions to "inventions" here is in its broadest sense. Imitation, it appears to him, plays socially the psychological rôle of memory; invention, he regards as the social equivalent of perception and decision, of judgment and will. In short, sociology as he understands it, is merely a magnified psychology—a *collective* psychology.

The reader must go to the work itself for the exposition of this psychology. M. Tarde will explain to him "how the social tissues are formed" and "in what manner they are organised." He has done this with rare talent. But does this collective psychology constitute all of sociology? Will the analysis of these two factors, imitation and invention, dispense us from studying the social structure in itself, in some such way as we study the organisation of the biological series? Is the search for a general expression of the results of human activity forbidden us, and will the abstract characterisation of such an expression, the law of Comte, for example, shut out forever the reality of the facts which it sums up and defines? In speaking of the "social tissues," M. Tarde, perhaps, is not so far removed as he thinks from that comparison of societies with living organisms which we shall now see another author take up and define with greater precision.

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M. le DR. JULIEN PIOGER, in his new work, *La vie sociale, la morale et le progrès*, still persists in basing sociology on biology. He admits, with Greef, that we find in the social life different functions from those of organic life; but maintains, nevertheless, that the justest conception which we can form of the social functions is to regard them "as manifestations of the social organisation in every respect analogous to what are called functions in biology." The knowledge of the individual does not exhaust the knowledge of the social datum. The moment he is taken into the collective organism the individual is no longer a discrete being. The conditions of his activity are then modified, as are also the effects of his acts. "Without the social structure, without its support, or bond, the individual

lives would succeed and come into juxtaposition with one another without presenting that unity, that continuity in time and space, which gives to each society its individuality and life."

But to what part of the organism are we to assign the individual? Man, answers M. Pioger, corresponds better to the blood globule than to the anatomical element properly so called. "Blood globules represent the living element *par excellence*; they circulate in all the tissues, etc." He adds: "Just as the grand biological functions, alimentation, respiration, circulation, and innervation are not discharged by the anatomical elements individually, but result from their differentiation, from their appropriation, from their specification, by organisation into physiological apparatus to which the blood supplies activity, similarly, the social functions are not the work of man individually, but result from the differentiations, adaptations and organisations of social elements into organs to which man transmits his activity."

That imitation, therefore, for which M. Tarde seeks his laws, is fundamentally conditioned by the social fact itself. Without reaction upon the individual no imitation; no reaction if the individual is not already united by bonds of solidarity with his fellows. Accordingly, we must always seek the point of a departure in the plasticity of a human being (imitation, evolution, selection, heredity, or instinct), the point of arrival in his social incorporation, in his "socialisation."

"It is not," writes M. Pioger, "because societies do not constitute living organisms that they resemble those organism so little, but because at present they are only in a lower stage of their development and because if we wished to compare them at all to living organisms we should do so not with the higher animals but with the lower organisms called polyzoans, in which physiological individualisation is still imperfect."

M. Pioger has many excellent pages on "progress." They flow from his leading conception and also show its advantages. I should only have to place some reservations on certain conclusions of his in the economical field, which I do not think are well founded.

M. G. LE BON in his *Lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples*, like M. Tarde, explains the phenomena of history by a species of collective psychology. He is not occupied with seeking out the secrets of events in the play of a "social logic"; but he regards the races as "individuals" and centres the life of history in the life of those races. He studies their psychological characters, their formation, the limits of their variability; he shows how the psychological characters of races manifest themselves in the different elements of their civilisation, how they modify each other, and finally, how they are dissociated. Races—historical races or nations—possess in the opinion of M. Le Bon characteristics of varying and very unequal worth, but stable. "Every nation," he writes, "possesses a mental constitution as fixed as its anatomical characters, from which its sentiments, thoughts, institutions, beliefs, and arts are derived." He maintains that "grand, permanent laws control the general march of each civilisation"; but among those permanent laws "the most general, and least reducible," appear to him to flow "from the mental constitution of the races." Let not the reader think, though, that M. Le Bon is seeking for a law of history in intellectual evolution, after the manner of Comte! Emphasising the importance of "ideas" as he does, yet when he studies the causes of the decadence of nations he discovers those causes in the degeneration of "character," and even slighting the import of intelligence in the success of nations. He excellently remarks that ideas have no efficacy until they have passed into the feeling. Still, some confusion subsists; for ideas are not equivalent to inventions. Either intelligence does not represent for M. Le Bon all that the word implies, or character signifies more than is implied in it. Hence arises a hesitation—one might say, a contradiction—in the thought of the author, and this is partly the reason that his work, although full of just *aperçus* (I discover in many passages the influence of Madame Clémence Royer, and above all of M. Charles Mismser) is not entirely satisfactory. The reading of the book is instructive and interesting, but one is not convinced nor moved by it.

One word more. The races of M. Le Bon so far as they constitute independent series correspond in a measure with the "possi-

bilities" reserved by M. Tarde, and place before our eyes the concrete varieties of history. But the relative place of the races in the chart of general civilisation is not determined by the characterisation; an easy comprehension of the whole is still lacking, and those "psychological laws of the evolution of the nations," even if they were less vague, afford us scarcely the least hold on the evolution of humanity.

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His latest book, *Les gaspillages des sociétés modernes*, will assure to M. J. Novicow the place which his previous works have gained for him among the economists of the French language. M. Novicow had shown progress to be involved in the different transformations of *competition* in life, which at the outset was purely biological but passed finally into the domain of ideas. He takes up to-day the study of the conditions which favor the economical progress of society and of the causes that retard or prevent it. The causes of evil are to be understood only from the conditions of the good, and if we define progress with M. Novicow as the adaptation of man to his environment, and of the environment to man, as effected in the least time, and with the least possible effort, we shall be near to conceding with him that the vice of our great social machines is their unbounded waste both of the time and labor of men.

Poverty, he writes, does not come solely from the inequality of the distributions; it still comes largely from the insufficiency of the goods to be distributed. The socialists complain of the first of these facts, but usually neglect the second. To attain a really adequate state of well being, it will be necessary at least to quintuple the present production. Now three fundamental errors prevent this: the confounding of wealth with money, the confounding of wealth with property, and the belief in a state of original perfection. The author shows, and this is the gist of the book, that the first engenders protectionism, the second social parasitism and the spirit of conquest, the third intolerance and routine.

No doubt M. Novicow will be reproached with not having always sufficiently taken into account the difficulties of adaptation peculiar to each time and each country—a neglect which has led

him at times to rather severe judgments. To this he will reply that he has only wished to sketch out a general preliminary plan to which it will be wise to conform. If other critics reproach him with having simplified the questions too much, they will at least do him the justice of granting that his purpose in simplifying them has been to make them more easily understood. He lays bare our most sensitive wounds; but he cherishes a confidence in the future which stimulates and comforts us.

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With M. FRANCELOU MARTIN'S new work, *La perception extérieure et la science positive*, we return to pure philosophy. M. Martin has order and clearness; but his habits of mind are not ours, and his reasonings have not convinced us. He has undertaken to show: (1) that science has passed through three very clearly marked stages—the substantialistic interpretation (of what things consist), the finalistic interpretation (why they exist), and the mechanistic interpretation (how they have been produced and are conditioned); (2) that science retraces the path of perception, but in the opposite direction: all that perception, or spontaneous, concrete observation has put into things (time, space, causality, finality, substance, individuality,) it is the effort of the scientific mind or abstract observation to get out of them again, by substituting quantitative relations for the qualitative relations which nature presents.

The first thesis is maintainable. I have myself long made use of a similar seriation for my own instruction, but I would not exaggerate its merits. As to the second thesis, the definition of M. Martin slightly perplexes me. If "perception" signifies the simple judgments by means of which in the multiplicity of sensations the mind gets light for arriving at a relatively precise knowledge of particular facts or "individuals," we may say that science has for its end the more exact knowledge of elementary facts or "concretes." If perception denotes merely tentative explanation, we may remark that it corresponds in some measure to the intellectual state designated fetishistic or theological. Take it as we will, then, perception appears to be only a species of imperfect science which in the historical or individual evolution remains the substratum of perfect

science. But I cannot very well see what the value is of the parallelism of M. Martin, from the point of view of a "philosophy of the sciences" and of the explanation of scientific development.

What appears most clearly in this work is the desire to withdraw *mind* from the action of the external world, to restore it as a primordial agent, to battle against the mechanical theories, and to reach the ground of idealism by the path of criticism. "Kant," says the author, "assumes things to be formed by the mind; the empiricists assume the mind to be formed by things; we shall consider it as forming itself by experience." M. Martin desires neither to neglect evolution as Kant did, nor to slight mind in the manner of the empiricists. He does not seek to conceal, I think that he *reserves* mind rather than discovers it. What does the old antithesis accomplish in which both idealism and materialism still loiter if not the objectification and substantialisation of simple logical positions.

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M. Tescanu publishes, with a biographical notice, the *Théorie sur l'ondulation universelle, essai sur l'évolution*, of his Roumanian compatriot, BASILE CONTA, a philosopher who died very young. The profundity of the work will interest the reader less perhaps than the intellectual character of its author. In some respects M. Conta was the disciple of Büchner. He calls himself a materialist, has cast aside all religious belief and sees in the universe only force and matter. With extensive knowledge, he has hardihood and penetration. But that does not prevent him from being naïvely enough a metaphysician. He thinks anew the science of others and aims to grasp the world in a formula. In his principle of universal undulation, where the evolutionism of Spencer is corrected by the attractionism, or rather gravitation, of Newton, I see a personal effort for a better comprehension of things by means of a hypothesis, I see a procedure of acquisition rather than a well-worked-out theory. M. Conta was a true philosopher, who was unfortunately not permitted to complete his full evolution and to fulfil all his promises.

I shall point out in closing an excellent work by M. GEORGES DUMAS, *Les états intellectuels dans la mélancolie*; a fine study by M.

FR. QUEYRAT, *L'abstraction et son rôle dans l'éducation intellectuelle*; a very interesting little book by GEORG HIRTH, which I have translated into French under the title of *Les localisations cérébrales en psychologie (Pourquoi sommes-nous distraits?)*; the *Spinoza* of M. LEON BRUNSWIEG, which seems to me an excellent *résumé*; and finally the *Philosophie de Jacobi* by M. LÉVY-BRUHL, an extremely erudite contribution to the history of German thought.

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