

# PANLOGISM.

IN REPLY TO E. DOUGLAS FAWCETT.

## INTRODUCTORY.

EDWARD DOUGLAS FAWCETT has earned a well-deserved reputation in two fields—*belles lettres* and philosophy. He is a novelist of great force, and at the same time a philosopher who has become widely known through his book, *The Riddle of the Universe*. In the latter he combines the elegance of a novelist with the keenness of a thinker, and shows himself excellently well versed in the history of philosophy. His results differ greatly from mine, but that does not prevent me from recognising his unusual abilities, which manifest themselves again in his present article, “From Berkeley to Hegel” (pp. 41–81 of this number), and I am specially indebted to him for honoring me at the close of his expositions with a critical consideration of my own views. A man of his compass deserves a hearing. I have, therefore, weighed his objections, and propose to make a few comments in reply.

Mr. Fawcett has read my *Primer of Philosophy* and various *Monist* articles of mine, but, interpreting them in the terms of his monadology, which is his scheme of thinking the world, he misconstrues the import of my propositions concerning the moral aim of life and the immortality of the soul. The main point of contact, it appears, lies in the principle, which we both recognise, that (as he expresses it) “in consciousness, or in activities akin in nature to consciousness, must be sought the explanation of the universe.” But our roads separate at once, for, taking this premise, Mr. Fawcett jumps at the conclusion that the nature of soul-life indicates

the existence of soul-monads, who then are made responsible for the continuity of soul-evolution and the relative stability of the spiritual phenomena of life. I may misunderstand Mr. Fawcett's theory, but when I hear the word monad, I think of a unit-centre, either of matter or of force, and there seems no doubt about it that Mr. Fawcett means to convey some such idea, for he speaks of souls as "impervious self-contained centres." Of what use the idea of a monad, of an impervious, self-contained centre, can be in the explanation of soul or consciousness is more than I can say. What has imperviousness to do with thought? Imperviousness is a quality of material objects, but not of soul, or spirituality, or mind. Monads and minds, centres and souls, have as little in common as atoms and ideas.

In order to reply to Mr. Fawcett's criticism, we must go over a good deal of ground, for he touches the most important problems of philosophy. We must ask : (1) What is soul, or spirit, or mind ? (2) What is reason ? (3) Does the unity of consciousness and the identity of personality prove the existence of monads ? (4) What does immortality mean ? and (5) What is the purpose of life ?

#### WHAT IS SOUL ?

Mind, soul, and spirit, are synonyms ; they are abstractions from the same reality with slight variations of meaning. We speak of soul when we think of the sentiments of a man ; we speak of mind when we refer mainly to his rational powers and the interaction that takes place among his ideas ; we speak of spirit when emphasising the significance and character of thoughts without reference to bodily conditions. We speak of the spirit of a book to denote its tendency and import, but we should not say that the book is ensouled, for it has no feelings. Should the expression be used, "there is soul in the book," we could only mean that it had been written by a man of sentiment, that the soul of the book is the enthusiasm which it is liable to rouse. While a book may bear the stamp of intellectuality, we cannot speak of the mind of a book, because the book is not active. It may contain thoughts;

but it does not think; it may present arguments, but it does not argue; it may be rational, but it does not reason. It cannot reply to objections which a reader may happen to make.

Assuming that the chemical elements are various forms of the same substance (which, according to the law expressed in Mendeljeff's series, is more than simply probable), and observing that the materials of which human bodies consist are not different from materials found in the air, the water, and the earth, and also in the stars, we come to the conclusion that the conditions of sentiency from which the soul takes its origin are a feature that is an inherent quality of all existence. The sentiency of a man is not inserted into his body, but is the inner aspect of his bodily organisation. It is the subjectivity of his objective existence.

"Soul" is used in two senses. In a general and loose way it means the entire subjectivity of man, as which it is a synonym of spirit and mind. In a special sense the word is distinguished from, and sometimes even contrasted with, mind and spirit. By "soul" in a general sense we understand the system and sum-total of all the different kinds of feeling that animate a sentient organism; and every feeling is conceived as the exact analogue of some nervous activity. The peculiarity of feelings, such as we know them from our own experience, and their practical importance, consist in this, that they represent, symbolise, or denote the various things, relations, and actions with which they are severally associated. The forms of the various feelings depend upon the forms of the conditions under which they were experienced, and thus they appear as images of the surrounding world. They are subjective states of awareness and at the same time pictures of objective reality, and their memories, being aglow with life, make up the fabric of personality.

Sensations and memories remain in constant communication among themselves. By a combination of two or more images new ideas can be produced; the process of procreating new images being called imagination. The interaction that takes place among the various images or representations is called thought. When thought remains consistent with itself and in agreement with the possibilities of actual existence, it is called rational, when it begins to con-

tradict itself, irrational.<sup>1</sup> Thus reason is in the province of thought that same intrinsic necessity and harmony which in objective existence is the condition of the cosmic order as it appears in the regularities which can be formulated in so-called laws of nature.

When we speak of soul as contrasted with spirit or mind, we refer mainly to the sentiency of representative images ; when we speak of spirit, we think mainly of their significance, and when we speak of mind we emphasise their rationality. That which pertains to sentiment is called psychical ; that which has meaning is called spiritual ; that which characterises the rules of the interaction that takes place among soul-forms is called mental.

#### WHAT IS REASON ?

We do not now intend to explain the origin of soul, mind, and spirit, for we have done so over and over and again ;<sup>2</sup> our purpose here must be to elucidate those points which are misrepresented by Mr. Fawcett. Suffice it, then, to repeat the definition that man's spirituality (his soul, his mind, his spirit) is a system of sentient symbols. Wherever feelings (that is to say, states of awareness) acquire meaning which is different according to the various forms of feeling corresponding to various forms of objective realities, there soul originates. Soul, or spirit, or mind, is neither an unknowable essence nor a mystical monad-entity, but a definite condition of being which depends upon definite forms of organisation, the characteristic feature of which is representativeness. A definite form of feeling is representative if it depicts, if it stands for, and denotes a certain reality to which it has become related and associated by repeated experience. The paramount importance of representativeness is obvious, for it is the representative value of feelings which renders adaptation to the surrounding world possible. In other words, while things devoid of mentality are at the mercy of circum-

<sup>1</sup>The problems of the *a priori* and Pure Reason are discussed in *Fundamental Problems*, pp. 26-60 (Chapter "Form and Formal Thought") and in the *Primer of Philosophy*, pp. 51-117. See also *The Monist*, Vol. II., No. 1, pp. 111-120 ("The Origin of Thought-forms").

<sup>2</sup>Especially in the first chapters of *The Soul of Man*.

stances, mind acquires the ability of directing and marshalling the forces of nature and of making them subservient to certain purposes.

There are various degrees of mentality, the highest of which is the rational comprehension of man. This leads us to the next question.

Reason is, in its last and most practical aspect, the agreement of mental actions with the universal conditions of reality.

The most important feature of reality is its form. Existence in the abstract is a mere generalisation, and as such it is that feature which all existences have in common; accordingly, it is the same throughout. But the forms of things are that feature of reality which determines the suchness of actual existence in every case. Yet, while forms vary, the laws of form are invariable and universal. The idea of a thing-in-itself is pure fiction, but the conception of form in itself (of pure form or absolute form) is not only correct, but it is also a truth of great importance.

The most abstract forms of thought are logical and arithmetical relations, which can be developed by purely mental experiment. The simplest instance is afforded in pure numbers, as follows :

We posit a unit (by taking a step or marking it as a dot, or a dash, or a stroke, or whatever you like) and call it "one"; we posit another unit (taking a second step or making a second mark) and call it "two"; another, we call it "three"; again another, we call it "four." So long as we keep the same name for exactly the same operation, referring it to the same starting point, we shall, with the same operations, always arrive at the same results. The statement " $2+2=4$ " holds good for all operations in which twice two units are added, whether it be a planet that makes twice two revolutions, or whether a boy plucks twice two apples off an apple-tree; under all circumstances the result will be the same; it will *always* be four.

Statements that hold good everywhere are called universal, and universality is the characteristic feature of reason. All the laws of reason are intrinsically necessary. If we speak of necessity in connexion with reason, we do not mean compulsion or coercion. The

immanent necessity of mathematics and logic means nothing more nor less than that its application is without exception; necessity in this sense is a synonym of universality. Universality is the most characteristic feature of reason. He who denies the universal application of logical thought-operations denies the existence of reason. A denial of Panlogism is a denial of the applicability of reason.

Reason applies not to any particular thing alone; it refers not to here or there only, nor does it describe the yesterday nor the tomorrow alone; it applies everywhere and at all times. Its nature is ubiquity and eternity. Reason consists of rules that formulate those features of the world which could under no circumstances be different—those which were the same from the beginning, those which would be the same for any imaginable world; it reflects the eternity of being; it even describes that which does not and need not evolve in the cosmic development; it reduces to exact terms what may fittingly be called the supernatural, for it mirrors that which applies not only to nature as it actually is, but to any other, to any imaginable kind of nature; it states those laws which would remain the same even though the whole world of actual existence were broken to pieces.

Kant is surprised to find reality in agreement with pure reason, and seems to take reason as the prior—that is to say, “as the prior to us,” not *πρότερον φύσει* but *πρότερον ἡμῖν*. But the truth is that reality is first; reality is represented in sensation, and when analysed by abstract thought, it is found to possess a certain inalienable feature which conditions the cosmic order of the world and renders the formulation of its regularities possible, and reason—i. e. human reason—is nothing but a reflexion of this inalienable feature of reality in consciousness, and originates with the apperception of the universality of the law of sameness.

The world-order is the most important feature of existence; it is that which constitutes the divinity of the cosmos; it is the Logos of the Neoplatonist and the fourth gospel. It is supernatural because it is the condition of all possible order. It is what Mr. Fawcett calls the *Prius*,—not a *prius* in time, but in dignity; not an antecedent, but the supreme condition of all things. It is that through

which all events can be classified in laws of nature. Being in its ultimate analysis the consistency of sameness, it is the condition of rationality in the individual reason of human beings. It is that which makes mind and purpose-regulated action possible, and is the ultimate ground on which all moral conduct rests.

Fichte's definition of God as the moral world-order is not only intelligible but also sensible, but his proposition that God is the absolute ego is neither a practical idea nor is it tenable on logical grounds; it has no sense. The man who can tell us what "absolute ego" means has not as yet been found, although it is well known how Fichte arrived at his notion of the absolute ego. He started from an exaggerated idealism according to which the sole reality was his own ego; a proposition at which his students began to make their jokes, saying that Professor Fichte and Mrs. Fichte were the only two true realities in the world. And when Fichte surrendered his idealism he did not say there was no ego-entity, but that all the various egos of human consciousness were phenomena of the absolute ego, which is God. But the individual history of Fichte's philosophical evolution does not justify us in retaining a term which testifies to the previous errors of its inventor.

Mr. Fawcett would probably not regard the cosmic order as real unless it were a world-spirit, or ego-monad. But is his theory justified?

As it was difficult to understand that air exists, so it is the more difficult to prove that this immaterial presence of the world-Logos is an actual reality, omnipresent and eternal.

People who are accustomed to imagine that only that exists which is material are inclined to regard it as a non-entity; but it is more real than the gravity of stones and the resistance of solid bodies. It is not nowhere, but everywhere; not never, but ever. It is the most inalienable quality of being; it is the most real feature of reality, and if we do not appreciate its paramount importance it is on account of its very omnipresence and unalterable permanence. The attempt to conceive that which in its very nature is superpersonal, as an individual being, as a world-spirit or a world-monad, or as an absolute ego, is a misconception of its most important feat-

ure, of that feature which constitutes its supermateriality, supernaturality, and divinity.

#### UNITY AND VARIETY.

The unitary principle that is involved in the universality of law does not exclude variety. On the contrary, it involves it. As there are not two points in the universe which, in their actual relations to the whole, are exactly equivalent, so space, time, and materiality are "the germs whence sprout the many," not by haphazard but according to the law that, under different conditions, the same combination will be *different according to the conditions*.

Sentient beings become rational by comprehending the universal features of existence such as are expressed with precision in the formal sciences, logic, arithmetic, and mathematics. While there is no unfolding of the Prius, the Logos, the prototype of reason, there is an evolution of rationality in sentient beings; and this evolution follows definite laws which, however, are not yet fully understood.

Hegel regards the theory that every thesis begets an antithesis, and that the struggle between thesis and antithesis will lead to a synthesis, as the highest law of the evolution of thought, the doctrine of which he calls dialectics. He uses the theory of his dialectics as a Procrustean bed in the history of civilisation and philosophy, leading to many artificial conceptions and vagaries. But while Hegel's dialectical method has its faults, we are not prepared to say that any and all dialectics are to be rejected.

Mr. Fawcett seems to think that all panlogism must be Hegelianism, and that with the overthrow of Hegelianism panlogism of any kind and conception is doomed.<sup>1</sup> Panlogism is an old theory. It has practically been the consciously or unconsciously avowed tenet of all religion and philosophy. It is the soul of Platonism; it lurks in the fantastic theosophy of Neo-Platonism; it is beauti-

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<sup>1</sup>The same idea prevails among the Hegelians who imagine that Hegelianism alone is a consistent philosophy of rational thinking. Of this the article by E. Digby in this number is good evidence. While Hegelianism has almost entirely disappeared in Germany, it seems still on the increase in England and America.



fully expressed in the Logos theory of the Fourth Gospel; it is not absent in St. Augustine and St. Thomas; among the schoolmen it is the philosophical background of realism, and finally it is the corner-stone of the spirit of modern science; it is the underlying keynote of monism, for arguments of any kind presuppose its truth. Without panlogism the universe would be a chaos of innumerable particulars, be they monads, or atoms, or what not. But if panlogism be true, the universe is necessarily and intrinsically a unity.

The unity of the universe is neither local, nor temporal, nor material; it is not comparable either to the center of a circle, or to the capital of a country. The unity of the universe is a unitariness of its constitution, and not the dominion of a central monad over other monads of less importance. It is not a definite unit, but a sameness of the laws of existence, a oneness of the cosmic order. God is not one in number, but one in kind. He is unique. To believe in one God, as opposed to several Gods, is a pagan view which is more advanced than polytheism but remains upon the same level.

#### THE UNITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

The fact upon which Mr. Fawcett builds his monadology is the unity of consciousness. The monadologists know very well that the mind consists of many images and exhibits a very complicated thought-mechanism, but they regard all thoughts as mere tools in the possession of the soul-monad. The fact that there is always one idea uppermost in a normal consciousness is explained by the assumption that the soul-monad selects one thought or another as an object of its attention. But the unity of consciousness is no more a reason for believing that man's soul consists of a monad, than the unity of a watch would be for supposing that there is in every watch an indivisible watch-monad which causes its hands to denote by their position one definite moment of time. The fact that one idea is the strongest and monopolises consciousness is no more wonderful than that a man can at a time walk in one direction only, and not in two, three, or four, or that his eyes can focus one object only and not two, or three, or more. If every unitary action de-

manded the presence of a monad, we would be in need of electricity-monads for electric currents, engine-monads for every machine, and national monads for every nation that has a distinct individuality and history of its own. The unity of consciousness does not imply that there is a definite and impervious centre in the conscious being but is conditioned by the object of attention, which may be a thing outside that is watched, or an idea, a purely mental representation that is considered.

But Mr. Fawcett will say that every man is in possession of an ego-consciousness which attests his identity throughout all the changes of his life. Yet what is that ego-consciousness but the habit of calling oneself by the same name, John Brown or Tom Smith, or whatever it be—a name which can be replaced by the pronoun "I." The word "I" denotes a man's personality, and his personality represents certain soul-forms in continuous development. A certain stock of thoughts and impulses remains permanent while others change and still others are added. Whatever view we take of a soul-monad, whether it be conceived as the ever-shifting attention that determines the unity of consciousness, or as the notion of one's own self, subsumed under the collective word-structure "I," or the continuity of our life-history, it can never be conceived as a centre. There are various ways of conceiving the unity of man's mental organisation, but this unity is not one of place or substance, and a monad-conception is perfectly redundant.

#### THE IDENTITY OF PERSONALITY A PRESERVATION OF FORM.

The immortality of the soul depends according to Mr. Fawcett upon the preservation of the monad of a man,—a very precarious immortality, indeed, for this monad is a very hypothetical creature. But so enthusiastic is he about the preference of his monadology that he fails to understand the monistic conception of immortality. He says, "If body and soul are inseparable, the soul must die with the body." Thus, he concludes, the monistic conception of immortality is "a mockery in all seriousness."

Now it is true that monism insists in a certain sense upon the inseparableness of body and soul; we cannot cut the soul out of

the body and say, here is my soul and there is my body. There are not souls in themselves. Wherever a soul exists, it is incarnated in a body. Mr. Fawcett might, in his imagination, pride himself on being able to remove the monad from the bodily system. It would be interesting to witness the experiment and to see what a monad looks like, how it is benefited by the mental acquisitions registered in the brain, and whither it migrates after its separation from the body; but other mortals like myself, who are less imaginative, will, so long as nothing is known about monads, find no comfort in his hypothesis.

But if there is no soul-monad, must we not accept the dreary theory that the soul dies with the body?

Mr. Fawcett forgets that while the soul is always inseparably connected with materiality, it is not identical with the body. We repeat: soul is the form of feelings, and the form of feelings depends upon the form of the nerve-activity of an organised system; and every organised system consists of definitely arranged groups of material combinations. The soul is preserved wherever the form is preserved; but the preservation of soul-forms does not depend upon the retention of those material particles which at a given moment constitute the body. The fact is familiar that the material particles of living beings are constantly changing. Life, physiologically considered, is *Stoffwechsel*, a constant flux of materials. There is no sameness of substance whatever. The identity of a living being involving the sentiments of consciousness is not maintained through the presence of a monad, but through the preservation of its form. All the many subconscious and conscious memories which form the elements of our mentality are definite traces of former sense-impressions, reacting upon sense-impressions, and embodying sentiments, and thoughts, the forms of which are preserved in the cerebral system, the substance of which is constantly changing. Am I for that reason another person because I cannot think the same thought twice with the same molecules? Does the thought change because the oxygen engaged in the first act of thinking has now entered new combinations and is soon to be discarded from the system as waste material? We might as well de-

clare that the significance of a word changes when it is written once in pencil and once in ink. Man's personal identity consists not in any way in an identity of material particles, but in the sameness of form which is preserved by the continuity of his existence.

#### IMMORTALITY.

The continuity of life appears to be broken in death ; but we must emphasise that it is not broken, it only appears to be broken. Every action in which a man manifests himself is a preservation of his peculiar personality, it preserves his individual life-forms and immortalises him. The spheres of influence vary greatly, but no man can fail within the range of his circle to impress his soul upon the future evolution of the race. The evolution of life on earth is as continuous as the life of every individual being ; and every individual being is such as he is only because the soul-treasures of former life are hoarded up in him ; he is not a beginning from nothing but represents the continuation of the soul-forms of which he consists at the start of his life. He is the product of evolution. He adds something of his own, be it little or much as the case may be, and impresses his soul into the new life that grows up around him.

These considerations are not fancies, but descriptions of the facts of life. This immortality is a truth and, indeed, an indubitable truth, which no one can deny. The same continuity of soul that takes place in every individual life, can be traced in the development of the whole of mankind. Mr. Fawcett has not offered a refutation. All he can say against it is that he is not pleased with it. He says :

"For myself I would not give two pence for an immortality of this kind, and I have no doubt that the average man in the street will heartily echo my sentiments."

We may fairly grant that the average man in the street does not care for preserving his soul in the further evolution of mankind, but Mr. Fawcett will scarcely pride himself on the applause of the vulgar, should his monadology be unfortunate enough to receive it. We might as well revive the Inquisition as an ultimate authority of orthodoxy as enthrone the man of the street upon the tribunal of

truth for deciding what shall be or shall not be acceptable. Whatever the man of the street may think, the fact remains that there is a preservation of soul-forms, and evolution would be a very mysterious process if this kind of soul-immortality through the continuous preservation of soul-forms were not true.

Quoting from me the sentence that "Christ is actually a living presence in humanity," Mr. Fawcett says :

"No, no, not so fast. The Nazarene's body has long ago mouldered into dust, assuming that he ever lived. His soul therefore, on the lines of monistic positivism has been extinguished. What is 'present in humanity' is not Christ, but ideas *about* Christ, which is a very different matter."

Now we concede that ideas *about* Christ are not Christ himself ; but the ideas *of* Christ are Christ. The soul of Jesus did not depend upon that heap of atoms which constituted his body ; the soul of a man consists in the thought-forms and word-forms which dominate his entire being and determine his conduct. The soul of Jesus consists in his teachings, and his teachings are preserved in words which have now been translated into all languages of the world. The words of Jesus are his soul, and his soul is immortal, and this is good Christian teaching too ; it is not a church-dogma but it is the doctrine of the Christ of the Fourth Gospel.

We read in John vi., 63, and to indicate the importance of the quotation I quote it in *pica* :

"It is the spirit that quickeneth ; the flesh profiteth nothing. The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life."

This is no figure of speech, but literal truth. Spirit is not a substance ; spirit is the significance of words ; and what is more significant than words that are true. Words are spirit, and it is the spirit that quickeneth. Christ lives where the word of Christ is received and where it becomes the motive of conduct. The materiality of man's life, the human body, is in its way important enough, but it is important only as the vessel of spirit. The body is not the man ; the atoms are not his soul ; the corporeal is not the highest and the immortal part of our being ; and, in spite of the temporary in-

separableness of soul and body, there is no truth in the identification of soul and body.

The soul of a man is inseparable from his body; and yet the soul is a distinct and disparate reality which can be preserved while the body is dissolved. In the same way matter and energy are inseparable. There can be no energy without matter and no matter without energy. Yet energy is a distinct and disparate reality. It can be transferred from the burning coal to the water in the boiler, and from the water in the boiler through the steam to the wheels of the engine.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE IMMORTALITY OF BOOKS.

Take an illustration. Here is the Bible. It consists, as all books, of many sheets of paper covered with little characters in black. Is the Bible destroyed if this copy of the Bible be burned? No, not at all. That which constitutes the Bible is not the material; it consists of those subtle forms which convey the spirit of the Bible. The spirit of the Bible, as it is embodied in the forms of printed words, is impressed upon the paper in printer's ink, but this spirit of the Bible does not consist of paper and printer's ink. Thoughts cannot be burned, and soul cannot be crushed by destroying the forms in which it resides. The inquisitors proposed to extirpate heresy and burned many thousands of heretics, yet they could not quench the spirit, and the heretics have now become the leading nations of the earth.

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<sup>1</sup>I limit myself in my reply to Mr. Fawcett to refuting those points regarding which a difference of opinion obtains. It would lead me too far to explain the various misconceptions of which I find him sometimes guilty. Suffice it to mention that by monism I understand a unitary world-conception, but not a system of thought which explains all facts as phases of *one principle*. (See Mr. Fawcett's article, p. 77, lines 12 and 13.) Matter and mind, body and soul, that which is perceptible by the senses, and spirit, are quite disparate realities. They cannot be conceived as mere phases of one and the same underlying principle. They are radically different abstracts, but they are abstracts made from one and the same reality. The view which subsumes the various qualities of existence under one head, regarding material phenomena as phases of mind, or mental phenomena as phases of matter, is a pseudo-monism which I propose to call henism. I insist that the unity of the whole of existence and the consistency of all truth do not involve the ultimate identity of the various qualities of existence.

## THE SIMILE OF THE SEAL.

Another instance of the preservation of form is the imprint of a seal. And indeed the simile is good because it shows, in a better way than the printing of a book, the immateriality of form. The paper receives the form of the letters which constitute the book in printer's ink. There is a transfer of matter and thus the allegory is apt to be misunderstood; but the imprint of a seal is no material transfer whatever. In making a seal-imprint we distribute a certain amount of sealing-wax on paper and stamp the seal on it. The amount of sealing-wax is the same before and after; but before the stamping there is no seal; the seal originates through the impression.

The seal may break or be destroyed, but it can be reproduced, and, whenever the selfsame form is again imprinted into wax, there the seal will reappear. True, there is no seal without sealing-wax or whatever other material be used, but the seal is not the material; the seal is the form which is impressed upon the material.

## MIND AND MORALITY.

Taking the facts of experience as the ultimate test of truth, and accepting scientifically elucidated statements of fact as the guide of conduct, we arrive at the conclusion that spirit is paramount in importance, and body is of no account whatever save in the service of the spirit. The value of anything material and also the value of our bodily make-up must be measured by its usefulness in the support and growth of the soul. In itself the flesh profiteth nothing. Inorganic nature is indifferent; the storm, the sunlight, the ocean, are neither moral nor immoral; they are neither good nor bad; they become good or bad simply through mind. If in the starry heavens two celestial bodies should meet in collision, their conflagration would be of significance only if somewhere living souls were affected; otherwise it is more indifferent than a child's sneeze.

I do not say that good and evil are mere illusions. Good and evil are actual facts; but in saying that good and bad, right and

wrong, moral and immoral, virtue and vice, are features of the mind, it is the use of mind that produces these contrasts by its attitude when confronted with the duties that life imposes.

Mr. Fawcett has a very low opinion of mind. He says:

"If right and wrong, good and bad, only exist in our mentality, it appears that the meliorist is sacrificing himself merely for a figment of his own imagination, a barren, thankless ideal of his own making."

This is both a misconception of what I said and an undervaluation of man's mental activity. I say Facts in the objective word are neither right nor wrong; facts are real; they are neither true nor false. If a geometer measures the height of a mountain, his calculation may be right or wrong; but the height of the mountain is not wrong when it turns out to be different from what we expected. In a word: Facts are real, but ideas representing facts are either right or wrong. Error and truth belong to the realm of mentality. Unmental things are neither vicious nor virtuous; virtue and vice rise into being together with mind, for they are attitudes of mental aspiration.

#### THE PURPOSE OF LIFE.

He who cannot comprehend the essentiality of form will never free himself from materialism in philosophy, psychology, and ethics. He will not appreciate that the most important realities are immaterial. He will try to think God and soul as substances or entities and seek the purpose of life in pleasure.

Mr. Fawcett's monads are entities. They are, closely considered, substances which, for the sake of ridding them of gross materiality, have been reduced to atomic size; and, as to the ethical aspect of life, Mr. Fawcett finds no value in soul-growth, in the acquisition of truth; in the comprehension of life and of its meaning, in the self-realisation of the soul apart from pleasures that may or may not accompany our mental evolution. There is no value in these or other accomplishments except they produce happiness. I said somewhere that evolution consists in the expanse of the soul and in a growth of mind, but that there is no perceptible increase of happiness. The ratio between our wants and their satisfaction re-



mains about the same, and, while it is true that many pains are alleviated, there is at the same time an increase of sensibility to pain. Thus there is rather a decrease of happiness in evolution, for children enjoy life better than adult people, and, in comparison with the lower races, who in their ignorance and simplicity are as happy as children, the most civilised people appear morose and gloomy. A wise man is not happier than a fool; on the contrary, the fool is mostly merrier than a wise man, who foregoes many joys because of his deeper wisdom. Of course there are intellectual and moral pleasures, which, if not greater, are nobler, than the greatest merriment of fools. But it is not (as Mr. Fawcett thinks) the pleasure which gives value to moral aspirations. He says :

“Meliorism does not find the value of life in reaping pleasures. Nevertheless, a value that does not relieve pain or produce, or tend to produce, pleasure, is a thing which I, for one, confess myself at a loss to understand. The term, in fact, seems meaningless. I fail entirely to see why we should vex ourselves here with ceaseless strivings and strugglings, when the cosy nooks of degeneration lie open to us.”

Certainly we need not strive and struggle. We have our choice. We can prefer the cosy nooks of degeneration, and if we prefer them we shall have them. There are countries which are governed upon the principle that progress is an evil, and there life is, in many respects, much pleasanter and quieter. Life in England, and especially in North America, makes great demands upon the people, and urges them to exert themselves to the utmost of their abilities. He who measures the values of life by the amount of pain relieved and the greatness of pleasures realised will pity them and regard their lives as failures. How different (and I, for one, say how much truer) is the standard of value given by the psalmist when he says :

“The days of our years are threescore years and ten ;  
 “and if, by reason of strength, they be fourscore years,  
 “*yet is their strength labor and sorrow.*” (xc., 10.)

I have surrendered the Apostolic creed in its literal acceptance, but I have never ceased to appreciate this sentence of the psalmist on account of its deep truth. In my mental evolution I have been alienated from the Christianity of my childhood ; I have abandoned

the dogmatism of church-doctrines ; and I have surrendered the paganism of believing in the letter that killeth. I have dared to seek the direct revelation of God in the facts of life and, in taking the consequences of my radicalism, I became more and more convinced that God spoke to the prophets and to Christ in no different language from what he speaks to us ; to you, to me, or to any one who is willing to listen. However much the spirit of Bible teachings is misunderstood ; nay, whatever errors the authors of the Bible may have been subject to, this much seems sure that they hit upon several very important moral truths which are by no means antiquated. From the standpoint of positive monism, I find them verified, and considering the errors of hedonistic ethics which cannot but lead people astray on the most important questions of life, I find that there is more truth in the two Bible passages quoted in this article than can be found in all the average irreligious literature of to-day. The doctrines of the old religions are in many respects misleading, but in so far as they teach right ethics, I do not hesitate to say that they reveal the truth. He who imagines that the purpose of life is enjoyment will, when he tries to realise the hedonistic principle, be unfailingly and sorely disappointed.

The evolution of mind is not important for itself alone ; it is important also and mainly as a revelation of the eternal in existence. Mind is an appearance of truth ; it is an incarnation of God. The purpose of mind, accordingly, is its own self-realisation, it is a higher and higher development of truth. The purpose of life is mental growth and mental evolution. Mind hungers for truth ; and truth is not only intellectual comprehension but also religious devotion ; it is not mere theory but a motive for action. Thoughts are not pure conceits, but motor impulses of a definite character, and, therefore, it is not simply a notion but a power. The more man acquires of truth, the more is he ensouled by God.

Priests have built temples and cathedrals, they have carved dolls and images of God, they have worshipped all kinds of symbols and regarded them as holy—but there is nothing holy except truth, and the highest aim a man can have is leading a life of truth.

EDITOR.